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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN STARTIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
WAYNE L. STARTIN, 
Defendant-Respondent,: 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiff, Helen Startin filed an action in divorce. 
The Defendant, Wayne L. Startin, answered and Counterclaimed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff a divorce on her 
Complaint and also awarded the Defendant a divorce on his Counter 
claim. The court ordered that the parties' home be sold with the 
net equity to be divided as follows: 
a. The first $8,000 to appellant representing the 
money she brought into the marriage, either individually or as a 
result of inheritance; and 
b. The remainder divided equally between the appellant 
and Respondent. 
The court further ordered that if Plaintiff desired to 
remain in possession of the home, she could buy out Defendant's 
net equity in the home as long as Defendant received the proceeds 
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of his equity within ninety (90) days of the signing of the 
Decree. The court ordered that the Plaintiff-Appellant could 
petition the court for additional time upon a showing that af· 
using due diligence, the home could not be sold within the nir 
(90) day period set by the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Court 
affirm, in its entirety, the Decree of Divorce of the trial a 
and asks this court to award to Defendant-Respondent attorney' 
fees incurred by Defendant-Respondent on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to supplement and, in some instances, to 
correct the Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of Facts, DefendE 
Respondent submits the following: 
When Appellant was divorced from her first husband, 
the Appellant's home was sold pursuant to the Decree of Divorc 
and the equity in that home was divided equally between AppeL 
and her first husband (R. 282). 
At the time the parties were married, Respondent hac 
debts of $2,034.00 at the B.Y.U. Credit Union and a $500.00 & 
at Walker Bank which Respondent paid off by using monthly pay· 
ments after the parties were married, and by borrowing money: 
the Granite School District Credit Union. (R. 47, 226, 227, 
1). 
Appellant gave Respondent $230.00 on May 9, 1969 an• 
deposited $2, 300.00 into Respondent's checking account on Jun· 
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27, 1969, and on August 7, 1969, the date the parties were mar-
ried, there was a balance in Respondent's checking account of 
$2,241.68, which Appellant considered to be a joint account 
after they were married and which went to pay both parties' 
obligations. (R. 192, 193, 228, 285, 286, 289, 290, 300 ex. 
28). With Appellants inheritance of $5,460.00, Appellant pur-
chased furniture to refurbish the living room, including a sofa, 
two chairs, a lamp table, coffee table, a dry flower arrangement 
and carpet for which the Respondent did not make any claim, and 
had one chair recovered; of the inheritance only $200.00 or 
$300.00 went into actually improving the house itself. (R. 303, 
304) . 
Appellant, at the time of trial, had two children 
living at horne, one of whom had reached his majority and who has 
received a four year grant in aid scholarship to Brigham Young 
and will be living in Provo during the school year and away from 
Appellant's residence. (R. 308,309, 310). 
Respondent had not begun living with another woman (R. 
186, 316, 317, 331). 
Respondent has continued to pay one-half of the house 
payment since the parties' separation. (R. 306,336). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION BY ORDERING THAT THE HOME OF 
THE PARTIES BE SOLD, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
THAT APPELLANT PAY DEFENDANT HIS EQUITY 
WITHIN NINETY (90) DAYS OR PETITION THE 
COURT WHEN, AFTER DUE DILIGENCE, THE HOME COULD 
NOT BE SOLD WITHIN THE NINETY (90) DAY 
PERIOD. 
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Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by or-
dering that the home of the parties be sold within ninety (9C 
days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The only 
basis for showing the trial court abused its discretion is t~ 
statement that Appellant is deprived of a home in which to 1~ 
and raise her children. Appellant does not contend that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the Findings of Fact ~ 
Conclusions of Law or Decree of Divorce entered by the court 
or that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error. The burden ~ 
lant has is of showing that there is such a serious inequity· 
has resulted from the Decree of Divorce as to manifest a ~ 
abuse of discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d, 409 (Utah 
1977); Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977). 
(emphasis added). 
Even though the proceedings in divorce cases are 
equitable, and this Court may review the evidence, considera~ 
deference is given to the trial court's findings and judgment 
because of his perogatives and advantaged position. Eastman~ 
Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976). 
Since the trial Judge has considerable latitude of 
discretion in the disposition of property, his judgment shoulc 
not be changed lightly, and in fact not at all, unless it wo~ 
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear 
abuse of discretion. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d lOBO (Utah 
1977). 
-4-
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After hearing the evidence, the trial court found 
that Appellant was entitled to $8,000.00 more of the equity 
of the horne than Respondent. This accounted for money which 
Appellant had brought into the marriage and had inherited during 
the course of the parties' marriage. Appellant does not dis-
pute the amount of equity awarded to her nor does she dispute 
the fact that Respondent is entitled to his share of the equity 
in the horne. The argument that if the horne is sold, Appellant 
is deprived of the horne applies equally to Respondent. Since 
the parties' separation, Respondent has not had the ben·efit 
of residing in the parties' horne and yet has been obligated to 
pay one-half of the house payment during the pendency of this 
action. By allowing both parties to receive the equity from 
the horne the court has fulfilled its responsibility of endeavorins 
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of the economic 
resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives on 
a happy and useful basis. Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1974). By freezing Respondent's equity for a period of five 
years, Respondent would be precluded from reconstructing his 
life on a happy and useful basis. 
In Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974), 
a case which had a fact situation very similar to the present 
case, the parties, during their marriage each contributed their 
entire efforts and income to the family enterprise and accumula-
tion of certain property. The horne was purchased by the parties 
1968, and Plaintiff-Appellant claimed that she paid the down payment 
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$3,400.00 from the sale of a previously owned home. The 
trial court ordered that the home should be sold and the 
proceeds be applied first toward the payment of the mortgage 
and liens, then to the judgments against the parties, then 
$400.00 to the attorneys for each party, and then toward pa~, 
of the debts and then finally, any amount remaining to be 
divided equally between the parties. This Court modified 
the Decree and allowed the Plaintiff-Appellant an additional 
$3,400.00 of the equity to compensate the Plaintiff-Appellant 
for the down payment that was used to purchase the family 
home. In the present case, the trial court has already made 
allowance for the monies that the Plaintiff-Appellant contend 
she brought into the marriage and acquired by inheritance 
during the marriage. Respondent believes that the Court's 
decision in the Humphreys matter should sustain the decision 
of the trial court in this matter and that no abuse of discu 
exists. 
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES FOR THIS APPEAL. 
Although the trial court ordered that each party w~ 
bear his/her own costs and attorney's fees, it is discretiona: 
with this Court that attorney's fees on appeal may be awarded 
Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 
279 P.2d 709 (1955), Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Uta 
1977). Since Appellant in her argument has stated no substanti 
reason or showing that the trial court clearly abused its dis 
Respondent believes that Appellant's appeal is without merit> 
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therefore Respondent is justified in being awarded attorney's 
fees for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason set forth above and because of Appel-
lant's failure to meet her burden in showing a clear abuse of 
discretion by the trial court, the Decree of Divorce should be 
affirmed in all respects, and Appellant should be required to 
comply with the Decree of Divorce. In addition, ~espondent 
should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs for this appeal. 
DATED this :~~ day of March, 1979. 
Respectively submitted, 
DAVID M. SWOPE · 
Attorney for Defendant-Respond 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the fore-
going Respondent's Brief by hand delivering the same to Mr. 
Thomas R. Blonquist, 431 South Third East, Metropolitan Law 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this IY~ day of March, 
1979. 
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